The outcome of Bill Clinton's health care initiative presents policy analysts and democratic theorists with a puzzle: How could vigorous discussion of health reform, introduced into the context of an emerging public consensus about its urgency, produce widespread incomprehension of the issue and foster public reluctance to embrace any specific proposal for change? Starting from the perspective of political theories of deliberative democracy, I approach the puzzle of failed health reform by pointing to the paradox of decision making in an adversary democracy. First, I argue that the policy initiative stalled because the debate was set up to depoliticize the question of health reform and thereby disengage citizens from the problem. Second, I defend a conception of "power-sensitive" deliberation, which I argue is a check against two typical mechanisms of depoliticization: factionalism and the "democratic wish." Third, I suggest four criteria for power-sensitive deliberation, which I then use to analyze the recent health care debates. Finally, I explore the incentives and obstacles to creating opportunities for this kind of deliberation.
struggle that challenges the very distinctions that sustain such boundaries (Habermas 1975; Fraser 1989) . Health care, a policy domain that was formerly the exclusive province of a nearly unassailable "stakeholder alliance" of organized medicine, insurance companies, and business, has been reconfigured into a "heterogeneous representational network" characterized by increasingly divergent interests among its three principal stakeholders and by the proliferation of increasingly well-organized "stake challengers" (Peterson 1993: 400, 413) . 1 Politicization involved more than simply redefining inadequate health care access from a "condition" of a privatized system to a "problem" meriting government intervention (Kingdon 1984) . Rather these changes in the array of interests vested in health care created an opening for citizens and policy makers to refuse the "trusteeship" that the medical profession has exercised over the delivery and regulation of health care in this country (Morone 1993: 723; Dahl 1989: chap. 4) and to contest the privatized definition of health care as a benefit of employment rather than a right of citizenship. 2 In short, by calling attention to the systematic insecurity of health insurance for the middle class -ejected from the system in increasing numbers by categories such as "preexisting condition" or by termination of employment -citizens and policy makers began to challenge the assumption that a privatized health care system is impartial, adequate, and just.
Although comprehensive health reform was brought to the policy agenda five other times during this century (Peterson 1993; Skocpol 1995a) , many analysts believed that this transformation afforded an unprecedented "conjuncture of problems and politics" that would give the Clinton administration a unique opportunity to enact it. For the first time, a widely held belief in the urgency of containing health care costs and guaranteeing fair social access to care was joined with new confi-this country (Kingdon 1984: 117, 141) . It was common during the debate for policy makers and media analysts to present the case for reform by singling out the United States as unique among its peers for "provid [ing] little guarantee of continuing insurance coverage to almost any individual" (Blendon et al. 1990: 191) , or by allying it in an "embarrassing" partnership with South Africa as one of the only two "industrialized nations not to guarantee access to care" (Peterson 1993: 402) . Comparisons such as these intimate a fundamental value shift that would redefine access to health care from a private benefit of employment to a public right of citizenship in an industrialized democracy. Various opinion surveys from June 1992 to June 1994 confirm this shift, indicating fairly consistent majority support (typically 61 to 65 percent) for some form of public guarantee of health insurance coverage . This evidence of a potential value shift validates analysts' early optimism about reform and justifies the retrospective claim that the Clinton administration's failure was "an enormously costly lost opportunity" (Skocpol 1995a: 485) .
In other respects, however, analysts could have predicted the failure of the initiative from the start. Comparing it with previous major social initiatives, Heclo (1995: 94) has argued that the Clinton reform plan was introduced into "an extraordinarily resource-poor environment." First, Clinton took office with a Republican majority in the House and a Democratic majority in the Senate that was four votes short of stopping a Republican filibuster on health care (Morone 1994) . Second, Clinton proposed large-scale progressive social legislation at a time of cutbacks in federal spending and of widespread public opposition to increasing taxes to fund social programs (Heclo 1995; Skocpol 1995b) . Third, the Clinton plan addressed multiple, "overlapping objectives" that were not easy to encapsulate in a compelling public message, did not clearly benefit a mobilized constituency, and had to contend with the various programs and agencies already established to administer health care (Heclo 1995: 88 -93; Skocpol 1995b: 78) . Fourth, the much-touted 1991 victory of Senator Harris Wofford (D-PA) notwithstanding, health care reform was not a "federated" movement capable of coordinating grassroots activism with state initiatives and national policy making, but rather principally an elite initiative at the national level alone (Heclo 1995: 89) . Finally, the Democratic Party lacked the mediating institutions to manage its principal resource: the groundswell of popular support for comprehensive health reform. As Skocpol (1995b: 72) has argued, the party no longer has a "national locally rooted infrastructure of loyal local organizations and allied groups (such as labor unions)" to consolidate grassroots support for elite initiatives.
By September 1994, after a year of organized debate on the Clinton plan, opinion polls showed that Americans were "increasingly divided, cautious, and conservative toward health care reform" (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995: 413) . Although a majority continued to support universal coverage, this support dissipated when pollsters presented voters with a choice among options to achieve it (Brodie and Blendon 1995) . During the debate, opponents of reform -enabled by economic conditions of decreasing unemployment and slowing inflation -changed the focus of the debate so that the dangers of expanded government authority and the threat of diminished access and higher costs for the already-insured became stronger than the need to centralize control over health care to ensure cost containment and achieve universal coverage (Starr 1995: 22) . Brodie and Blendon (1995: 406) report that "by the end of this debate, the middle class became more worried about the possible negative effect of health reform than they were about the problem itself." In effect, the Clinton health care initiative provided opponents with a "focusing event" (Kingdon 1984 ) that was more compelling than anything its proponents could manufacture; by mobilizing their resources, they shifted the terms of the debate so that government-sponsored reform began to seem worse than inadequate access and insecurity (Starr 1995: 22, 29) .
Remarkably, then, introducing the health reform initiative pushed health care off the "decision agenda" (Kingdon 1984: 4) , and debating the question of health care reform served not to clarify public preferences but to confuse them. The biggest achievement of the health care initiative was to crystallize inchoate public support for universal coverage into a firm consensus against comprehensive reform. This outcome presents policy analysts and democratic theorists with a puzzle: Why did vigorous discussion of health reform, introduced into the context of an emerging public consensus about its urgency, produce widespread incomprehension of the issue and foster public reluctance to embrace any specific proposal for change?
Various analysts have suggested that the Clinton plan for reform by "managed competition" or "competition within a budget" stalled because it was too conservative to rally the support of the typical Democratic constituencies. It is no secret that Clinton committed himself to managed competition during the campaign as part of a deliberate strategy to "find common ground with moderates and conservatives," and to frame health reform to appeal to middle-class concerns about security while minimizing the problem of access, which is more of an issue for the poor (Starr 1995: 25) . Whereas analysts have characterized the plan variously as a "middle way" (Skocpol 1995b: 68) and as a "corporate class" solution (Navarro 1995: 458) , they agree on one thing: The administration's proposal was designed to fit the health care problem to a solution that would do little to challenge the existing system of employer-based insurance (White 1995) .
I assess the effect of this strategy from the perspective of political theories of deliberative democracy. If citizens were confused about reform and reluctant to advocate any specific change, it was, in part, because the debate was set up to depoliticize the question of health reform and disengage them from the problem. Clinton's allegiance to managed competition, together with the way he publicized that solution, was a strategic move to contain a potential realignment of the fundamental "boundary conditions of the political system," particularly those that separate the realms of politics and the market (Habermas 1975: 46 -47) . By assuming that reform would have to be instituted through the private insurance market, the administration foreclosed the question of whether health care should be a benefit of employment or a right of citizenship. The administration then orchestrated its public presentations of health care reform to prepare the way for the Clinton plan, not to formulate alternative interpretations of the problem or to consider other ways to solve it. By staging the public debate to suppress such questions, the Clinton administration inadvertently helped stall the momentum for reform. 5 The conventional, interest group pluralist assessment of citizen participation in mass democracies -that public debate is more likely to erode norms of equality and fairness than to enlarge their scope -would suggest an opposite thesis (Berelson et al. 1954; Dahl 1956; Schumpeter 1942) . 6 From this perspective, we could argue that the health care debate was overly politicized and that citizens' incapacity to make reasoned choices contributed substantially to stalling the reform effort. But I base my explanation on a rival body of work in democratic theory that contends that unreliable and unstable public preferences are not the cause of irrational public decision making, but rather are the product of the structure, content, and media of "adversary" democratic public discourse (Mansbridge 1983) . 7 I try to redirect analysts' focus from partisan fighting and gridlock -which attributes the failure of health reform to an overly politicized process in which competition among factions precluded the formation of bipartisan consensus -toward mass political processes that derail policy reforms not by fomenting conflict but by containing it. Whereas the more conventional pluralist analysis provides ammunition to those who attribute the problems of this political system to "an excess of democracy," the depoliticization thesis supports the rival claim that greater public participation in decision making is not the cause of partisan paralysis but its remedy (Barber 1984: xi, chap. 5) .
Adversary Democracy and the Depoliticization of Conflict
This claim that depoliticization explains the failure of President Clinton's health care initiative will sound absurd to policy analysts and scholars of American politics. After all, wasn't health care reform politicized to an exceptional degree by the unprecedented transfer of electoral campaigning tactics to a public policy issue? In reportedly the "largest, most sus-
6. Interest group pluralism is a theory that emerged in the United States in the 1950s to both model and justify mass democracy (Dahl 1956 ). In contrast to normative models of democracy that assume that citizen participation is central to democratic self-governance and that power is determined by majority rule and grounded in a principled assessment of the public good, interest group pluralism claimed to be an empirical theory that could explain how democracies could work without high levels of participation and in the absence of common public values (Held 1987: 186 -195) .
7. Adversary democracy is the term Mansbridge (1983: preface, chap . 1) uses to characterize interest group pluralism for its assumption that, given the primacy of self-interest and absence of shared values, citizens' interests groups and their representatives are primarily self-interested, collective action must be adversarial rather than deliberative, which means that decisions are reduced to deals to be concluded by brokering and bartering claims. Adversary democracy is not synonymous with Madisonian democracy, nor does it characterize American politics in its entirety, despite the fact that since Dahl's (1956) influential reading of Madison's Federalist No. 10 , that work is typically invoked as an exemplary statement of interest group pluralism (see, for example, Steinmo and Watts 1995; Smith 1995) . For more comprehensive readings that emphasize the role that deliberation plays in Madison's theory of representative government, together with faction, see Mansbridge (1990a) and Sunstein (1990: 209 -223; . tained advertising campaign to shape a policy decision in the history of the Republic" (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994a: 1), political action committees and other interest groups spent more than $50 million on broadcast ads, print ads, direct mail, and brochures to lobby markets that would influence opinion shapers. Furthermore, was the congressional debate over health care not also exceptionally partisan, with Republican legislators participating in the reform debate in a purely strategic fashion, scuttling the initiative to position themselves for the 1994 midterm elections? These indicators might be read as proof that there was not too little politicization but too much: A veritable explosion of factional conflict derailed an administration that was naively rationalist in its confidence that a system that accounts for one-seventh of the national economy could be redesigned by an "egghead" task force in a matter of months (Fallows 1995: 26) .
The problem with such a conclusion is that it rests on conflating genuine politicization with mass campaigning, partisan wrangling, and interest group competition, features of adversary democracy with which it has little in common. Adversary democracy is a "marketplace" model of politics that, although conflictual, is power indifferent (Mansbridge 1983: 17) . The model is conflictual because it assumes that politics, like the market, is driven by private self-interest, that citizens' preferences are intransigent, and that decision-making procedures can aggregate preferences but not transform them. It is power indifferent because it assumes that power is dispersed throughout society and, like resources in a free market, continuously circulated through value-indifferent brokering among diverse, equally competitive interest groups (Held 1987: 192) .
Deliberative theories challenge this model by politicizing its fundamental conceptions of interest, group, and competition. First, they maintain that citizens' interests are not privately held and fixed before political engagement but shaped in and through the very processes of political contestation. Given opportunities for deliberation, the immediate interests of citizens or their representatives could be informed by considering the future consequences of present choices and by testing those choices against a plurality of alternate understandings (Barber 1984; Cohen 1989; Knight and Johnson 1994; Manin 1987; Mansbridge 1990a; Sunstein 1993) . Second, they argue that power is not dispersed throughout society, but that interest groups and the conflicts among them are determined by a history of asymmetric social group relations that creates systematic inequalities in the present distribution of status, resources, and influence (Bell 1987; Sunstein 1993; Young 1990 ). "Social groups," according to Young (1990) , should be understood in contrast both to interest groups, which organize voluntarily to pursue an instrumental goal, and to ideological groups, which are also voluntary but organized to pursue a principle. A social group is not voluntaristic but is a historically and culturally determined "collective of people who have affinity with one another because of a set of practices or way of life; they differentiate themselves from or are differentiated by at least one other group according to these cultural forms" (Young 1990: 186) . To politicize conflict is to account for how it is permeated by social group differences and to acknowledge the structural inequities that those differences engender. It is, in Donna Haraway's (1988: 589) terms, a "power-sensitive, not pluralist" theory of democratic politics.
The Clinton health care initiative is a classic example of how adversarial institutions and processes depoliticize conflict. Depoliticization occurs through two distinct but interrelated mechanisms. The first is factionalism, or the proliferation of competing organized pressure groups, that diffuses a conflict and reduces principled decision making on a policy issue to self-interested bargaining over resources. In the case of health care, legislative bargaining discredited and rejected options such as a single-payer system, insurance cooperatives, the employer mandate, and, eventually, universal coverage. By drawing successively tighter circles around the domain of reform, factionalized conflict drastically limited the scope for government intervention.
Factionalism prompts a countervailing mechanism of depoliticization that works not by proliferating conflict but by suppressing it. This mechanism is the "rhetorical and ideological pattern" that Morone (1990: 11, 7) calls the "democratic wish": the ideal of principled reform determined by "a single, united people, bound together by a consensus over the public good which is discerned through direct citizen participation in community settings." Despite its rhetoric, Morone argues that the democratic wish undermines democratic self-government in several ways. First, it erodes political accountability by addressing reform to an amorphous "people" rather than to a specific constituency. Second, it displaces political and social contestation over the details of a reform program onto a vague moral imperative for change, and forecloses debate by setting up a discursive context in which dissenting views seem like crimes against the "common good." Finally, it casts the implementation of reform as an administrative task to be achieved by neutral, self-regulating bureaucratic mechanisms, sacrificing "traditional political accountability . . . for the politically useful illusion of technical precision." Morone (1993: 731, 737 ) characterizes the democratic wish as a mechanism of depoliticization that epitomizes the "American political reflex . . . [to] make choices untainted by politics" (emphasis added; see also Habermas 1970) . Whereas factionalism is competitive and power indifferent, the democratic wish is consensual and power denying.
Depoliticization, then, is both a structural tendency and a historical pattern of democracy in the United States. However common it may be, it is counterproductive. Depoliticization curtails deliberative citizen engagement in questions of public policy and, with it, the "ripening of arguments" that persuades citizens that a problem exists (Heclo 1995: 91) and the "adjustment and learning" that is necessary to secure their consent to major structural reforms (Skocpol 1993: 548) . 8 If factionalism and the democratic wish depoliticize political questions, how is it possible to structure mass public discourse to better serve democratic decision making?
Power-Sensitive Deliberation versus the Democratic Wish
In an ideal democratic polity where deliberating -not voting -is the principal activity of citizenship, the principle of deliberative democratic legitimacy can be stated concisely: Questions of public policy should be decided "through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens" (Cohen 1989: 21; see also Fishkin 1991; Habermas 1989 Habermas [1962 ). Public argument and reasoning, in turn, would follow norms of argumentation that are determined consensually under conditions that exclude "all force . . . except the force of the better argument" and "all motives except that of a cooperative search for truth" (Habermas 1984: 25) .
As a model for participation in a heterogeneous, mass society, this ideal poses two problems. First, it equates deliberation with direct citizen-to-citizen engagement, drawing its model of social interaction from an idealization of the Athenian agora and the eighteenth-century public realm. Not only is this an anachronistic ideal but it carries with it a conception of deliberation as dispassionate, legalistic argumentation with which educated white male professionals are particularly at home (Young 1993) . Second, this model suggests that democratic deliberation should bring citizens' interests to converge on a common good (Mansbridge 1990b) ; in an adversarial polity and stratified society, such an assumption merely plays into the democratic wish.
In a mass democracy, information is mediated by a social system that is far more complex than the Athenian agora or eighteenth-century public realm. Consequently, deliberation is neither exclusively face-to-face nor the solitary province of a rational individual but a systemic process: "Political information and interpretations are produced and disseminated through a complex social system which involves organizations, division of labor, and transmission through social networks" (Page and Shapiro 1992: 262 -263) . In turn, given vast inequalities of both wealth and access to information, an exclusive focus on the common in an adversarial polity "makes it harder for any participant to sort out what is going on" (Mansbridge 1990b: 131) . Although deliberation under such conditions often fosters a convergence of opinion about policy goals, it should instead provide clarification regarding how the needs and interests of social groups conflict.
A politicized deliberative process would have a twofold aim. It should enable citizens and legislators both "to make an informed choice among competing policy proposals" (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994b: 12) and to evaluate the extent to which that choice "conform[s] to, rather than challenge[s], societal patterns of dominance and subordination" (Fraser 1992: 182) . Although such a process would be governed by fairly conventional criteria of equality, inclusivity, openness, and reasonableness, these criteria would be implemented in a way that is neither power indifferent (as in interest group pluralism) nor power denying (as in the democratic wish), but rather, again borrowing Haraway's (1988) term, power sensitive.
There are three important differences between "wishful" models of democratic deliberation and this "power-sensitive" alternative. First, power-sensitive deliberation primarily serves not to resolve conflict but to focus it: to identify the plurality of perspectives from which a particular problem can be defined, to explore how different definitions of a problem make some solutions seem more plausible than others, and to clarify the different interests that are served by preferring one interpretive frame to another. As such, it is a process that would allow "relevant constituencies to sort out, and hopefully reduce, the dimensions over which they disagree," in order that they can "agree about what is at stake in a particular political conflict" (Knight and Johnson 1994: 282 ; emphasis added). Furthermore, as it is an adversarial model, decisions are made by a vote in which the preference of each participant would count equally (Manin 1987: 359; Mansbridge 1983) . Second, then, the outcome of power-sensitive deliberation cannot be accorded the special moral weight it would carry in a wishful model, but must be acknowledged as the mere contingent preference of a majority.
Third, the final decision is represented differently in the two models. In the wishful model, deliberation is conceived as a process by which private interest is reformulated as "public seeing," and its outcome is presented as a goal to which every civic-minded person should accede (Barber 1984: 201) . In contrast, when deliberation concludes in a vote, it is recognized that, in the period following one decision and preceding another, some parties to the deliberation "are forced to abide by decisions that do not correspond with their will" (Manin 1987: 360) . Thus, on the theory that "the lucid recognition of [its exclusion from the majority] makes it possible to take the minority, its opinions, and its interests into serious account" (Manin 1987: 360) , power-sensitive deliberation provides formal mechanisms to delineate the limits of consensus.
The following account of the four criteria for deliberation -equality, inclusivity, openness, and reasonableness -follows the premise that the purpose of deliberation is to provide information and to promote confrontation among organized publics who hold different perspectives on policy problems, to the end of clarifying and developing their positions so that they are "firmer" for having been clarified but not dogmatic for having engaged the objections of others who do not share them (Manin 1987: 349) .
Four Criteria of Power-Sensitive Deliberation
Equality Equality, the most important criterion of a democratic deliberative process, is also least likely to be achieved in a socially stratified mass democracy. If the "information system" is, as Page and Shapiro argue, critical to deliberation in a mass society, then one way to equalize deliberation would be to uncouple the production of political information from the market. 9 This would involve establishing regulations to offset the effects of disparities in material resources on media coverage of different groups' positions. 10 Public monies should finance the production and dissemination of studies that identify groups whose material resources and organizational networks allow them a disproportionate impact on policy making. These studies would begin to provide power sensitivity with respect to the information system.
Inclusivity
Inclusivity requires a concerted effort to inform and mobilize social groups that are typically marginalized by decision-making processes, and building mechanisms into the policy process to hold decision makers accountable to the preferences of such groups (Young 1990: chap. 6 ). 11 The participation of such groups might be encouraged by organizing the discussion of various reform proposals to address conflicts of interest around social cleavages such as class or race (Verba et al. 1978) . One way to focus such conflict without intensifying it might be to use public monies to fund and disseminate research that would engage a plurality of institutions (including policy institutes, universities, and consumer advocacy groups) in comparative analyses of the differential effects of reform proposals on various social groups. These studies could be publicized by any number of existing mechanisms, including televised debates that Disch I Publicity-Stunt Participation 15 10. The simplest way to do this would be to abolish political advertising altogether and rely exclusively on televised debates, town meetings, and interviews. Alternatively, radio and television stations could be required to set aside slots for political ads and distribute them for free and equitably among qualified groups and candidates. Sunstein (1993: 121) has argued that such regulations need not be deemed incompatible with the First Amendment, insofar as courts were to recognize the "difference between a system of democratic deliberation and free markets in communication." If the protection of free speech is understood in relation to the need for democratic deliberation, which requires discussion of public issues and an airing of diverse perspectives, then not regulating the airwaves but rather ceding them to market mechanisms is inconsistent with democratic principles (Sunstein 1993: chap. 2) . Regulating campaign finance is an indirect way to address these same disparities by limiting the dollar amounts of both contributions and expenditures by individuals, political action committees, and candidates during a campaign (whether it is an election campaign or a policy campaign, as in the case of health reform). Sunstein argues that despite the Court's assertion of fairly strict prohibitions against setting limits on campaign expenditures (as opposed to contributions), it might be permissible to institute a system of public election financing in which candidates would accept such limits as a condition of public funding.
11. Young (1990: 184) lists three provisions: (1) resources to fund "self-organization of group members"; (2) resources to fund group analysis and formulation of policy proposals and institutional mechanisms to ensure that decision makers consider them; and (3) group veto power over policies that directly affect the group. The question of whether democratic equality is enhanced or eroded by group-specific policies and participation is widely debated. For a discussion and review of the literature, see Phillips (1992). would specifically focus on the question of differential group impacts, or "town" meetings whose constituency would not be drawn from the residents of a geographic location but from various organized social groups.
Openness
Openness requires that parties in deliberation "arrive at a decision by a process of research and comparison among various solutions" from "not only multiple but conflicting points of view" (Manin 1987: 352) . Achieving openness means ensuring that the decision-making process is public at every stage, from the initial period when policy options are formulated to the final vote. It also means cultivating a "pluralistic" climate for discussion, in which members acknowledge that they "have divergent aims, and do not think that some particular set of preferences, convictions or ideals is mandatory" (Cohen 1989: 21) . Practically, this would mean discrediting "wishful" arguments that invoke a nonspecific common good to justify a policy proposal, and validating those arguments that specify the constituencies they would privilege. Power sensitivity with respect to inclusivity and openness would require explicitly naming relevant constituencies that could not or would not participate in the process, and also mapping the "mobilization of bias" in a conflict: analyzing how predominant values, institutional procedures, and relations of power determined the issues and options that were introduced for deliberation (Schattschneider 1960: 71; Bachrach and Baratz 1962 , 1963 Lukes 1974 ).
Reasonableness
Reasonableness requires that proposed solutions be approved or refused on the basis of interests and arguments, rather than on prejudices or preconceptions. Television, the primary medium for disseminating information in a mass democracy, is the biggest obstacle to reasonableness. Advertising -a form of communication that substitutes assertion ("sound bites") for argument and invites false inferences rather than enabling point-by-point comparison of competing claims -has infiltrated every instance of televised political discourse (Jamieson 1992 : parts 1, 4). In turn, the epistemic frame of this information system -the terms in which it defines knowledge and teaches voters, candidates, and officials to think about politics -is a "strategy schema" that turns elections from decisions into contests. This schema invites the electorate to a posture that is "cynical and detached" rather than knowledgeable and engaged and uses the campaign consultant as a model for the citizenvoter (Jamieson 1992: 165 -167, 187) . In an adversary democracy, information is produced and packaged to frustrate the reasoned exchange of claims by candidates or policy makers and the evaluation of those claims by citizens "to determine which argument has the greater force" (Jamieson 1992: 216) .
Achieving reasonableness in an adversarial information system would require imposing checks on polemical and misleading advertising, encouraging greater reliance on more in-depth formats such as debates and interviews than on advertising, and providing citizens with the information they need to critically evaluate the messages they receive from television. Checks could include structural regulations on the minimum length of advertisements to discourage sound bites, stricter rules regarding disclosure of sponsors, and extending to policy ads the same protections of speech that cover candidate ads. 12 Given that the information delivered by an adversarial system is necessarily partisan, deliberation under such conditions can never be impartial; consequently, reasonableness is better fostered by enabling citizens to be power-sensitive consumers of partisan information than by trying to purge "bias" from the system.
A Power-Sensitive Analysis of the Health Reform Debate
The process of President Clinton's health reform initiative can be divided into four phases. Phase 1 occurred during the campaign when candidate Clinton made what Paul Starr (1995: 24) characterizes as a "move to the center right" to embrace managed competition "within a budget," a market-oriented approach to universal coverage. Phase 2, from the inauguration to the following fall, involved drafting the White House plan. This was a phase of withdrawal from the public, during which responsibility for policy formulation was assigned exclusively to a Health Care Task Force that worked in consultation with a 500-member team of health polDisch I Publicity-Stunt Participation 17 12. A Federal Communications Corporation-licensed television or radio station cannot refuse a political ad for a bona fide candidate because of its content, but rather only if it differs in length from the time purchased, fails technical broadcast standards, lacks a tag identifying its sponsors, or is obscene (Jamieson 1992: 215) . In the health care debate, this would have meant that stations could not have used the threat of libel to refuse the "Pizza Hut" spot (which criticized the corporation for failing to provide health care for employees of its franchises in the United States). icy experts, government officials, congressional staff members, and state officials (Skocpol 1995b: 70) . Phase 3 began with a dramatic reentry into the public realm -the health care town meeting in Tampa, Florida on 23 September 1993-and extended through the spring of 1994 with a series of carefully orchestrated town meetings, public discussions, and demonstrations. Phase 4, congressional debate, lasted approximately from June 1994 to the "death" of the legislation between August and September.
Despite the appearance of an abrupt shift from expert problem solving to public engagement, the task force and the public events were complementary strategies to depoliticize the policy process. Whereas the task force tried to create the impression of a policy produced beyond the reach of special interests, the public events were designed to rally public support for reform without defining specific constituencies to which the new system would have to be accountable.
Drafting the White House Plan
The initial phases of the health care policy process sent a message that health reform was a technical and administrative problem to be solved by policy experts, not open to political debate. It began with Clinton's commitment to managed competition during the campaign, which preempted debate even before it began and closed the door on reasoned discussion of reform alternatives both to the left and to the right of this marketbased approach. The proposal for a single-payer system, for example, was consistently positioned by the administration as a radical fringe threat to free enterprise, even though it had ninety-three sponsors in the House and was evaluated by the Congressional Budget Office as being likely to reduce annual medical spending by $114 billion per year. 13 Furthermore, opinion surveys throughout the early 1990s showed that 60 to 64 percent of Americans were willing to consider this option, registering consistent support for tax-financed "national health insurance" (Shapiro and Jacobs 1994: 17) .
Openness was further violated after the inauguration with the establishment of the task force, a working group that typified the kind of "bureaucratic politics" that tries to defuse a politically charged issue by transforming it into a technical problem of administration (Morone 1993: 731) . Although it was not as secretive and detached from the practicalities of governing as the media portrayed it (the group met with nearly six hundred relevant organizations), the task force did protect its deliberations from scrutiny by the press and the public (Fallows 1995: 29) . The press retaliated against being shut out by caricaturing the task force as "stealthy" for its secrecy and needlessly complex: "an effort so elaborate that senior White House adviser Ira Magaziner's description of it -complete with charts, graphs, calendars and checkoff boxes-ran twenty-two pages" (Priest 1993) . By its withdrawal from the public, the task force not only drew ridicule for the technocratic excesses of the president and his staff but failed to "lay a basis of public understanding for the emerging Clinton reform plan" (Skocpol 1995b: 70) .
Not surprisingly, the administration justified the news blackout as a measure to protect task force members from lobbying by interest groups and badgering by reporters, as if privacy would afford them an impartial position from which to discern the best possible health proposal untainted by political influences. This effort at impartiality would have been more convincing had the task force not accorded such deference to the interests of large insurance companies in adapting the "managed competition" strategy. Besides violating openness, this predisposition toward a market-based solution also compromised inclusivity. For one, Jecker (1993: 665) argues that its commitment to employer-mandated health care would have amplified the coverage inequities that already exist by virtue of a "pervasively gender-structured" labor market in which women hold a preponderance of lower-paid, lower-status, and part-time jobs. 14 Finally, the task force also undermined equality by fostering the kind of private influence peddling it was intended to circumvent. While the task force worked, at least 650 special interest groups related to the health industry spent more than $100 million (Lewis 1994) . Much of this took the form of either direct contributions to legislators with influence over key committees or indirect expenditures to sponsor advertising (Citizens Fund 1993: 3) . Although expenditures do not translate directly into influence, various changes -including the House reforms of the 1970s that democratized the committee structure, the declining significance of parties and the increasing centrality of television advertising to elections -made legislators more dependent on such funding and Congress more "permeable" to organized interests (Peterson 1993: 413) . Health reform was also a virtual jobs creation act for nearly one hundred law, lobbying, and public relations firms (almost twice the number retained for the conflict over the North American Free Trade Agreement) that enlisted an unprecedented number of former members of Congress and former executive branch officials in the policy process (Lewis 1994) .
Agreement is widespread that the administration's withdrawal from the public during the task force period was a "tactical mistake" (Raines 1994; Starr 1995) . It gave grassroots opposition nine months to mobilize, to convene meetings in the districts of swing-vote legislators to organize opposition against the employer mandate, and to design negative television ads for the forthcoming campaign (Universal Coverage at Risk, 1994) . 15 It also allowed House Republicans to mobilize against reform, and they planned a weekend in December 1993 when more than fifty town meetings would be convened in twenty-four states to display public opposition against the Clinton plan (Toner 1993). Ironically, in its attempt to do an end run around politics by pursuing a technocratic strategy toward reform, the task force merely contributed to the political stalemate.
Taking the Plan to "The People"
The third phase of health reform, which began on 23 September 1993 with a town meeting in Tampa, Florida, exemplified the strategy of the "democratic wish." While they may have seemed participatory, the various public events from this phase, from the town meetings to the bus caravans, conformed to a "plebiscitary model" of democracy that makes leadership a matter of packaging policy for a media-consuming public and blurs the boundaries between campaigning and governing (Fishkin 1991: 47-49) . 16 The plebiscitary leader directs energy toward impression 20 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 15. Howell Raines (1994) argues that the "lack of public hearings wasted an opportunity to build public support and increase the pressure on Congress to respond to public need rather than the health care lobbyists."
16. While avoiding press conferences on the topic, Clinton made health care a focus of more than thirty public appearances during this period, both at the White House and around the nation. These consisted of seven interactive events (such as town meetings, public discussions, conference calls, and one round table); three appearances on national talk shows including CNN's Larry King Live, CBS's This Morning, and Don Imus's morning radio show in New York City; several Saturday radio addresses; and nearly twenty addresses to special constituencies (mostly senior citizens and medical professionals, but also women's health groups and labor groups). management and approval ratings rather than to public education and problem solving: "Actions are calculated in terms of their effect on public opinion and how they can best be presented to favorably influence public opinion" (Fishkin 1991: 48) . The purpose was not to politicize health care but to personalize it: to convince a majority of voters that there is a health care crisis among working citizens who, through no fault of their own, cannot get the care they need for themselves or for their families.
During this phase, by presenting health reform as an all-inclusive social problem, the administration paradoxically compromised inclusivity by obscuring group-specific social differences. For example, in a 3 November 1993 public meeting in Ambridge, Pennsylvania, Hillary Clinton declared health reform "a challenge to make sure our country still works, we still listen to each other, we still act together, we move beyond partisan politics and gridlock, we overcome the special interests, and we do what is right and responsible for all of us." By depicting health care as a moral imperative -"what is right and responsible for all of us"-she invoked a homogeneous public that is unified in its needs and should be unified in its support for the administration's reform legislation.
President Clinton used similar symbolically inclusive rhetoric to describe the victims of the health care system, thus foreclosing any discussion of group-specific differences with respect to reform. In a 30 October 1993 Saturday Radio Address, Clinton asked: "Who are these people caught in this broken system?" He answered:
hard-working Americans . . . [who fall] through the cracks of our health care system . . . a working mother with a sick child that had to buy her own insurance and who, every month, must ask herself, 'Do I pay the rent or the medical bills'; the seventh grade teacher with breast cancer whose insurance provider disagreed with doctors over her care, the teacher had to run herself into debt to pay for her own chemotherapy; a doctor frustrated by miles of red tape and forms that steal time he should have with his patients."
By the characters he invokes here -a mother in a low-wage job, a woman in a low-status profession, and a prestigious male physician -he implies that this "broken system" affects all Americans, all across society, and in the same way. And yet, at the same time, he is careful to assure his audience that these are "hard-working Americans," persons with otherwise orderly lives in which the "broken system" is a discrete and arbitrary interruption. McBride (1993) has argued that framing health problems so narrowly, as problems that originate in the health care system per se, makes it difficult to address the particular needs of African Americans. For poor inner-city African Americans, McBride argues, health is not a discrete problem but an inextricable feature of social conditions that, from a middle-class perspective, are unrelated to the health care system: high unemployment, inadequate urban social services, drug abuse, urban violence, and "the political self-centeredness of new immigrants and mainstream whites." Furthermore, there are race-based differences in the "health" of white and African Americans, with the latter experiencing radically higher numbers of "preventable" deaths (from such problems as cancer, heart disease, substance abuse, diabetes, homicide, and AIDS) than whites do (McBride 1993: 330 -331) . By attributing health problems exclusively to insecurities associated with health insurance coverage, Clinton glossed over race-and class-based inequities that differentiate social groups and addressed the health reform initiative to a predominantly white, working-and middle-class audience.
This rhetorical strategy was authored by Families USA, the "de facto public relations manager" for the Clinton administration during this second phase, as a way to mainstream the health care initiative (Lewin 1994) . A tax-exempt educational foundation, lobbying, and consumer group, Families USA was not a typical interest group, but rather a kind of philanthropic political action committee funded by Massachusetts businessman Phillipe Villers to shape public opinion in support of social programs. The group had fastened on health care in the late 1980s and, showing an astute understanding of the information system in an adversary democracy, took up the task of devising a media strategy for promoting reform. The centerpiece of this strategy was to compile monthly research reports documenting the numbers of workers who lose their health care each year or go without it, and to build up a "misery bank" of stories of sympathetic persons whose lives had been compromised by the health care system. Summing up the strategy, the group's executive director explained, "Generally, people act out of self-interest, not out of altruism. So if you want them to care about health reform, you don't talk about the uninsured, you talk about people who have lost their insurance" (Lewin 1994) .
The mark of this group was particularly evident on the interactive events -town hall meetings, public discussions, and conference callsthat occurred during this phase. Each was subsidized (to a greater or lesser degree) by the "misery bank." These events were typified by the television news strategy of using "dramatic atypical instances" to define policy problems and give them purchase on the public imagination (Jamieson 1992: 31) . Whereas these events might have provided an occasion for debate between Clinton and other political leaders with an expertise in health care, their format was largely anecdote-and-answer. Clinton would take testimony from individuals (physicians, patients, administrators) who were struggling to compensate for the inadequacies of the current health system, or from those who were trying to accept the tragedy of a loss -of a loved one or a life's aspiration -that the system caused. He would then respond by affirming that the stories would end differently if his plan were enacted. 17 These were not deliberative events but, as Jamieson notes, "theatrical moments married to therapeutic response" that were staged to show a particular face of the people: those victimized by the health care system.
Finally, reasonableness was compromised during this phase and the next by the way that interest groups and the administration applied election-style politicking to the policy-making process. In what Altman (1995: 25) calls a "development of historic importance," organized interest groups that typically influence the policy process by lobbying Congress discovered that they could make a direct appeal to the public "by using the tools of political campaigns for private purposes" on an unprecedented scale. Opponents of reform and its supporters waged their campaign using broadcast and print advertisements, direct-mail appeals, talk show appearances, and even a bus tour. Expenditures on advertising alone were more than $50 million, approximately equaling the combined advertising outlay of both the Bush and Clinton campaigns for the 1992 election (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994a). The ads discouraged reasoned evaluation of reform alternatives, eschewing point-by-point comparison and constructive problem solving for a simple attack strategy. They also aggressively prevented informed choice by misrepresenting the options. One-fourth of the print ads and more than one-half of the broadcast ads were unfair, misleading, or false (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994b: 2). Furthermore, most ads failed to clearly disclose the "origins, size and agenda" of their sponsors and, thereby, made it difficult for viewers to pick up the "ideological cues" that would enable them to find their bearings in the debate (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994a: 5). The advertising blitz was not so much a debate as a "communication bypass," in which genuine deliberative engagement about the problem of health care and the relative merits of the various proposed solutions was deflected by attacks and scare tactics (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994a: 3).
Congressional Phase
The final phase of the process was the most plebiscitary of all, and the most volatile. Its most dramatic shift occurred over redefining the administration's relationship to health care reform. In July 1994, Democratic legislators made a strategic decision to underscore the distance between the reform proposals in Congress and the proposal designed by Clinton's task force, and thereby dissociate the health initiative from an increasingly unpopular president. Polling results in June had indicated that voters' opposition to anything labeled the "Clinton Plan" had increased from 33 to 49 percent during the past year, even though many actually concurred with two pillars of Clinton's proposal: More than three-fourths of all Americans supported guaranteed universal coverage for all, and more than one-half thought employers should pay for all or most of the cost (Berke 1994: A12) .
The most ironic shifts in this phase came in the permutations of the concepts of "universal coverage" and "employer mandate." The "Clinton plan" originally proposed guaranteed coverage for all Americans by 1998, to be funded largely through mandating employers to pay 80 percent of the cost per employee. In an effort at compromise, Senate majority leader George Mitchell redefined universality as covering 95 percent of the population, and he softened the mandate from an immediate requirement to a fallback provision; employers could be required to pay one-half the cost of workers' premiums beginning in 2002, should the goal of 95 percent coverage fail to materialize by 2001 and Congress fail to determine an alternative solution.
Debates in committee during this phase devolved into sound bite polemics that did nothing to clarify the reform alternatives. Instead, Republicans used health care strategically to weaken the Democrats, discredit Clinton, and thereby position themselves to win control of Congress and the presidency (Skocpol 1995b; Fallows 1995; Starr 1995) . Senator Phil Gramm characterized George Mitchell's reform legislation as a government takeover of the health care system that a majority of American citizens opposed as a threat to their "freedom," and Senate Republicans generally met every Democratic proposal for reform, no matter how diluted, with the charge that it amounted to socialized medicine, even asserting at one point that health reform would lead to "a medical Gestapo knocking on your parents' door" (Toner 1994b (Toner : A8, 1994a .
Outside Congress, public activity turned into publicity-stunt participation as Families USA initiated the "Health Security Express," its last major attempt to rally public support for health reform. Organized in conjunction with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and Health Right, the bus caravan was consistent with the Families USA general media strategy of drawing on its "misery bank" and appealing to the populist sentiments of the democratic wish. But in contrast to the town meetings, which were, from a public relations perspective, relatively successful at testifying to the inadequacies of the health care system, the caravans were an embarrassment. Modeled after the bus tours of the Wellstone and Clinton elections, and probably also designed to recall the Freedom Rides of 1964, the caravan was an attempt to transfer a campaign and protest strategy to a policy-making process to which it had neither a symbolic nor a strategic connection. The Freedom Riders challenged the segregation policies of Southern bus stations by violating them; bus riding, by contrast, had no immediate connection to health care delivery except that the buses, like the system, kept breaking down. Unlike the Wellstone and Clinton tours, the "Reform Riders" had nothing to campaign for because the caravan took to the roads at a time when a specific reform objective had yet to emerge in Congress. Lacking any principle other than "universal coverage," which was being mangled at that time by the equivocations of legislative leaders and the White House, the Reform Riders merely went from town to town telling stories of ways that their ambitions had been frustrated by the existing health care system. The style, again, was testimonial rather than deliberative; in some instances, the buses were even rerouted to avoid dialogue, skipping stops where protesters gathered to meet them (Manegold 1994b) . Drawing meager crowds and attracting little media coverage, the Reform Riders failed to advance the public debate over health care, but rather mirrored public ambivalence about reform by touting an increasingly ambiguous principle of universal coverage while evading the question of how to pay for it.
The Health Security Express exemplifies in a nutshell the means by which elites organized public participation to contain conflict. Throughout the reform effort, the voice of "the people" was sounded as that of the victims of the current health care system, and of a political process dom-inated by special interests. As one of the organizers of the bus caravan said, the Health Care Express was "for the folks who can't afford to buy $20 million worth of advertising but still want to get their voices heard" (Manegold 1994a) . Organizing public participation through such a "vehicle" simultaneously raises the issue of power and contains it, because it sets up a symbolic confrontation between corporate interests and their innocent victims, instead of critically examining who has purchased the rights to frame the health care problem and determine its solution.
Politicizing the Policy Process
This essay has analyzed the puzzle of failed health reform by pointing to the paradox of adversarial democratic decision making, which foments conflict while depoliticizing matters of public concern. The health reform initiative is a classic instance of depoliticization by the democratic wish on one hand and factionalism on the other. By its twofold strategy of technocratic policy formulation and plebiscitary leadership, the administration did as much to stall reform as did the hundreds of interest groups and partisan opportunists who precipitated the roadblock in Congress. Given the many attempts to sell the president's reform plan to the public -the town hall meetings, public discussions, and Health Security Express -it would seem that the Clinton administration did everything possible to foster a process of "adjustment and learning within a democratic polity," and build consensus on reform (Skocpol 1993: 548) . But despite these unprecedented opportunities for citizen participation, the debate did little to make citizens feel they possessed adequate knowledge to decide among the various reform proposals. 18 One reason for this is that these participatory events focused little on providing citizens with systematic, comparative evaluations of the various proposals. Rather, they were conducted largely in a campaign mode by mass advertising, televised town meetings, scripted public discussions, and talk show appearances. Citizens' engagement at these spectacles was mostly testimonial rather than critical. The scripts were similar: individuals' struggles against the health care system assumed heroic proportions in nation-26 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 18. In October 1993, an ABC News/Washington Post poll found just less than one-fifth of its respondents claiming to know "a lot" about the plan and the rest reporting that they knew "a little" (53 percent) or "almost nothing" (30 percent) about it. By July 1994, this ratio remained almost constant, with the most substantial gain in knowledge occurring among those who ventured to report knowing "a little," which showed an increase of eight percentage points during the nine months wide televised events in which an empathic president heard stories of persons who had their career advancement frustrated by "job lock" because of "preexisting conditions," their resources depleted by longterm illness, and their family members taken from them arbitrarily by "preventable" deaths. These events depoliticized public opinion, positioning citizens as victims of an abstract health care system who were petitioning their government for reform rather than as critical decision makers confronted with a choice about a public problem.
What would a more politicized process have involved? At the most basic level, it would have required the media and political actors to present information to enable citizens to understand the various health care proposals and make valid comparisons among them (Jamieson 1994) . President Clinton, for example, could have engaged citizens' questions critically rather than empathetically, analyzing the problems they described in relation to the current system and comparing the ways that various approaches to reform, in addition to his own plan, would address its defects.
But furthermore, because there is no unbiased standpoint from which to decide among competing options, the most important task of a politicized process would have been to put the various proposals in an ideological and social perspective. For example, treating the single-payer option as a reasonable partner in discussion rather than as a lunatic threat would have permitted a more informed comparison of the administration's plan with rival proposals and would have broadened the ideological continuum of the health care debate. Placing proposals into perspective would also have involved resisting two aspects of the democratic wish. First, making explicit comparisons of how various policy proposals would affect specific social groups differently would have resisted the wish to address reform to a unified, amorphously defined public. Second, publicizing reports by public advocacy groups such as Citizen Action and the Center for the Public Integrity, both of which produced analyses of influence-buying by members of the insurance and health industries, would have challenged the ways that plebiscitary leadership constructs the public -as victims of a social system petitioning their leaders for help and as a directionless mass to be "influenced and molded" until they subscribe to official preferences (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995) . Such studies, however, were neither identified with "the people" nor amplified with anything approaching the volume of human interest stories. Contextualizing arguments and information in this way would have discredited Republican claims that the Mitchell and Gephardt plans amounted to socialized medicine and government-run health care. At the same time, however, they would have exposed the efforts of the Democratic leadership to effect a "middle-range" reform that aimed to make the existing system more inclusive without interfering with such key institutions and features as the market, insurance companies, and the relative autonomy of the medical industry (Skocpol 1993: 541) .
In addition to changing the character of the information that citizens receive, politicizing the process would also involve contesting the dominant "political rationality" that inhibits support for universalizing coverage (Jacobs 1995: 154) . Jacobs (1995: 143, 151 -152) argues that a peculiarly American "supply state" logic -defined by a primary commitment to expand the "supply of technologically sophisticated health care" combined with a willingness to tolerate "uneven access to available medicine"-promotes self-interested organizing and rules out collective action to fund expanded access as an irrational objective. Politicizing the health care debate would involve shifting this focus from the costs of access to the costs of "excess supply" (Jacobs 1995: 150) . But, given a federated administrative structure that fragments responsibility for health care and proliferates faction, which is compounded by the lack of mediating institutions to articulate and amplify an effective counterrationality, such a shift would be difficult to effect. In the recent debate, opinion shapers such as members of the Clinton administration exercised no leadership on this question, but instead worked actively to suppress discussion of supply for fear of triggering anxieties about rationing and mediocrity.
What resources does the current system possess to move beyond sound bite polemics and publicity-stunt participation to a power-sensitive deliberative process? Various analysts have suggested that the press could play a central role in such a transformation by engaging alternative policy proposals rather than fixating on strategy and personal dramas in their coverage (Annenberg Public Policy Center 1994a; Jamieson 1992; Fallows 1995) . Like the "ad watches" that national and local newspapers initiated in 1990, this kind of reporting would involve assessing the fairness and accuracy of claims forwarded in debates and advertisements, comparing proposed alternatives and testing the soundness of the arguments deployed in defense of the various positions (Jamieson 1992: 216 -217) . Given both their central position in the information system of a mass democracy and their historically designated, although romanticized, role as a watchdog for a democratic citizenry, the print and electronic media could be a leverage point for power-sensitive deliberation.
But there would be many obstacles to such a transformation, including professional journalists' code of objectivity, which, with the commercialization of the press, has precipitated reporters toward strategy coverage that is both adversarial and power indifferent (Hallin 1985) . Furthermore, insofar as a principal task of the commercial press is not to inform and educate its readers but to deliver them as an audience for the advertising spots that fund the production of the news, viewers and readers are "the product [of media programming] as well as its users" (Sunstein 1993: 58) . This means that advertisers and publishers would have to be convinced that there would be as extensive a market for deliberative coverage as there is for horse races and spectacles before they would pay reporters to produce it. But there can be no transition to a more deliberative system as long as policy makers persist in depoliticizing public problems as I have argued the Clinton administration did in the health reform initiative, by playing on factionalism and the democratic wish.
If the Medicare initiative of this past fall provides any indication of the lessons that legislators gleaned from the demise of the Clinton plan, it seems they have concluded that where large-scale reform is concerned, the less deliberation the better. In a blatant power play that flaunted equity, inclusivity, openness, and rudimentary ideals of democratic representation, House Republicans approved plans for a 20 percent reduction in Medicare spending, a cut that would double the cost of premiums and deductions to beneficiaries over seven years, with less than a week's consideration. House committees frustrated any reasoned comparison of alternatives by convening and concluding hearings on reform legislation whose text had yet to be written and whose economic impact had yet to be analyzed by the Congressional Budget Office. Once again, publicity stunts served in lieu of reasoned argumentation. Outside the Capitol, House Democrats staged a protest hearing on the lawn to rouse opposition against the Republicans' refusal to permit them time and space for further debate. Inside the Capitol, representatives from senior citizen's groups dramatized their exclusion from the process, marching onto the floor of a hearing room with their mouths taped shut. Predictably, the media covered these stunts, reported the disparities between Republicans' claims and analysts' calculations of projected savings, and noted the contradictions among rival assessments of the effects of medical savings accounts. But it did little to focus the kinds of comparisons that would permit reasoned decision making. In a move that is typical of the cynicism that has characterized the Republican majority's manipulation of democratic ideals, the maneuvering over Medicare moves even farther away from deliberative leadership under cover of a "contract" with the American public.
